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Geopolitics, Eurasianism and Russian Foreign Policy Under Putin

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Although the “rise” of geopolitics and Eurasianism to discursive prominence within the Russian post-Soviet foreign policy discourse has been widely discussed in the literature, their relegation to the margin of the said discourse a decade later has passed largely unnoticed. Only a few attempts to account for this fall from grace exist, and their proponents agree that Eurasianism had become a spent force in Russian politics by the time of President Putin’s ascendancy to power because it failed to sustain a coherent foreign policy, particularly following Russia’s failure to restore its pre-eminence in the post-Soviet space. On the level of practical geopolitical reasoning, therefore, Eurasianism is reduced to geopolitics, i.e. the politics of spheres of influence and hegemonic spatial control, while Eurasian identity construction is dismissed as unconvincing, strategic and self-serving. However, this article attempts to provide an alternative explanation for the decline of Eurasianism under Putin – the one that focuses on the attempt within post-revolutionary and post-Soviet Eurasianism to theorise both a unique identity and a credible ideology, i.e., what Eurasianists themselves termed “ideocracy”. Therefore, a classification of Russian geopolitical thinking is provided according to the different ways in which the intellectual legacy of classical Eurasianism is being invoked and appropriated. Both ‘traditionalist’ and ‘modernist’ geopoliticians invoke Russia’s Eurasian identity in order to answer the practical question ‘how?’ – how Russia should preserve its territorial integrity and enhance its international standing. Proponents of ‘civilisational’ geopolitics, on the contrary, employ the ideational resources of classical Eurasianism in order to answer the question ‘what?’: what is Russia in the post–Cold War world. It is argued that the answer

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to this latter question – given that two possible attempts to apply Eurasian ideocracy to post-Soviet conditions have developed – is a necessary step to answering the question “why?”: why Eurasianism has been effectively sidelined under Putin turning into a metaphorical dog that did not bark.

THE GEOPOLITICS/EURASIANISM CONSTELLATION IN RUSSIAN POST-SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

One of the truly remarkable features of the Russian post-Soviet foreign policy debate has been an almost simultaneous re-emergence of the two inter-related and mutually reinforcing discourses: discourse on geopolitics and discourse on Eurasianism. Despite a multitude of competing ideas, blueprints and ideologies, only the discourse on geopolitics/Eurasianism constituted Russia's most comprehensive and thorough attempt to come to terms with the Soviet collapse and the international order it gave rise to. Commitment to geopolitics understood as a balanced, non-ideological assessment of Russia's national interests was first officially articulated by Russia's first Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev in 1992. Defined as a “normal view of national interests” in contrast to the ideologised foreign policy of the Soviet era, this understanding of ‘geopolitics’ had very little to do with ‘politics as territorial control’ or with a need to ‘carve out’ geopolitical spheres of influence. Rather, on the liberal post-Soviet reading the term ‘geopolitics’ was given a new lease of life in order to close the door on the ideology-permeated foreign policy of the Soviet past and to reinforce the self-evidence of Russia's new liberal, democratic and pro-Western credentials, to establish them as a new rational consensus and the only viable foreign policy option. Most importantly, perhaps, the recourse to ‘geopolitics’ was meant to call off the centuries-old search for a distinct Russian identity and to move the debate from the discussion of identity into the discussion of Russian national interests. Still, the bottom line is the almost complete lack of any crude geographical reductionism or determinism in the conceptualisation of geopolitics advocated by the liberals in the Kremlin in the immediate post-Soviet years.

This non-geopolitical definition of geopolitics came under sustained attack in the run-up to the 1993 parliamentary elections. Discursive struggle over the definition of ‘geopolitics’ was spearheaded by a coalition of the increasingly insurgent Russian military and nationalist opposition parties; it reflected a popular concern with a variety of problems stemming from Russia's post-Cold War international environment – most notably the problems of Russia's territorial integrity – that could neither be solved nor even viewed as problems from within the dominant liberal paradigm. The common denominator of such ‘nationalist’ geopolitics was the need for Russia to pursue

its national, i.e., geopolitical, interests which would reflect geopolitical realities of post-Soviet and post-Cold War politics. Nationalist geopolitical arguments were unabashedly read 'off the map' and therefore presented as self-evident and objective, i.e., non-debatable. Such practical geopolitical reasoning of a 'common sense' type proved to be a valuable political resource not only from the point of view of advancing the nationalist cause, but across the whole of Russian post-Soviet political spectrum.

Thus, promoted by the hard lessons of conflict mediation attempts launched in 1992 as well as by the fear of being outflanked by the military-backed Far Right and the Communist Party, Yeltsin's political elites began to adopt geopolitical vocabulary in an attempt to snatch some nationalist ground from the opposition. The official geopolitical discourse of the Yeltsinite period was a problem-solving discourse which presented security along Russia's newly established borders as a problem and made pursuit of Russian national interests a key to its solution. In particular, once an exclusively territorial definition of security was articulated, this foreign policy problem was easily translated into geopolitical images and metaphors. The South in general and newly independent successor states in particular were conceptualised as a breeding ground for instability and conflicts that could potentially spill over onto the territory of Russia proper and threaten its territorial integrity. As a result, in a distinctly geopolitical move drawing new borders on top of the already existing ones, the newly independent states were subsumed under the designation "common post-Soviet geopolitical space", i.e., a natural sphere of Russian influence affecting its vital interests. In a nutshell, a pronouncedly geopolitical security discourse was brought to life in order to protect an already spatially defined common good and communal value – Russia's territorial integrity.

To recapitulate, the rise of 'geopolitics' in the Russian political discourse of the early 1990s in both its liberal and nationalist versions was part and parcel of a broader conceptual shift from an ideology-permeated and mission-oriented foreign policy to an interest-driven one associated with diversification and pragmatism. However, the inherent nationalism of geopolitical thought proved impossible to confine within the pragmatism-inspired liberal paradigm. The limits of pragmatism were clearly revealed in 1993 when a foreign policy shift required as its discursive legitimation both a new definition of geopolitics *and* recourse to classical post-revolutionary Eurasianism which in the hothouse political climate of the 1990s became a synonym of Russia's geographic, strategic and worldwide cultural-political distinctiveness. That Russia's Eurasian *spetsifika* became a common frame of reference for Russian foreign policy makers from 1993 onwards was immediately reflected in the literature which began to refer to the official 'pragmatic nationalist' position in between pro-Westernism and extreme nationalism as "the Eurasian middle ground", "the Eurasianist alternative" and "Eurasian lobby".¹

While the rise of 'geopolitics' marked a transition from an ideology- to an interest-based foreign policy, the discourse on Eurasianism was meant to press home the claim that the rejection of ideology and the new-found pragmatism do not imply the other extreme – the rejection of the sense of mission to guide Russian foreign policy.² In contrast to the utopian messianism of the past, however, post-Soviet Russia should set itself realisable goals. Therefore, Russia's new-found Eurasian mission rested on sound objective foundations. Russia's unique strategic location enables it to have legitimate international interests and be an integral player in both Europe and Asia, so that all attempts to force it solely into Asia or Europe are "ultimately futile and dangerous".³ In Central and Northern Europe, the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East and the Pacific Rim region Russia functions as a "multiregional Eurasian power" helping to avoid regional imbalances and to prevent any one country from exerting a controlling influence in the area.⁴ Russia's sheer geographical dimensions presuppose a global rather than regional perspective on international affairs allowing it to have multilateral ties with all the power centres of today's world and perform a global counterbalancing role in the post-Cold War environment.⁵

In addition, in politico-normative terms Russia's mission in Eurasia was based on the premise that peace and stability within Russian borders should also be supported 'on the outside' by a civilisational balance between East and West, which Russia alone can ensure. In addition to being a global power, Russia has a centuries-old experience of relations with the Christian, Islamic and Asian worlds. In both civilisational and geopolitical terms, therefore, Russia is uniquely placed to unify and reconcile Orthodoxy and Islam and to use its position in the UN in order to support a "multilateral dialogue of cultures, civilizations and states".⁶ As envisioned by post-Soviet Russian Eurasians, Russia's mission in Eurasia should be that of a mediator between Western institutions and Eastern diversity and that of a guarantor of Eurasian and, therefore, global stability.

By analogy, Russia's engagement with the post-Soviet successor states spans both a geopolitical and a civilisational dimension. Geopolitically, Russia is hailed as a Eurasian power because it alone can ensure stability within the common post-Soviet geopolitical space. At the same time, Russia assumes responsibility for stability in Eurasia not simply because it alone has capabilities necessary for political-military deterrence. Conflicts within the common geopolitical space of the CIS affect Russia's vital interests because it is also a common post-Soviet civilisational space. Empire is gone, but Russia is still closely integrated in the affairs of all the now independent post-Soviet successor states, not least because of some 20 million ethnic Russians now living in the newly independent states. Their well-being can only be ensured as part and parcel of a common project aiming at "the cultural self-preservation and further development of national traditions and co-operation among Slavic, Turkic, Caucasian, Finno-Ugric, Mongolian and other peoples of Russia within

the framework of Eurasian national-cultural space”.⁷ Hence the CIS is transformed into the main arena of Russian conflict mediation efforts and a natural sphere of Russian influence.

What has the above discussion revealed about the ‘geopolitics’/‘Eurasianism’ interface in Russian post-Soviet foreign policy? Underlying the claims of Russia’s Eurasianness was a concern with the international legitimacy of Russian national interests and a perceived need to impart a moral dimension to Russian foreign policy transcending the pragmatics of power politics or reading foreign policy arguments ‘off the map’. It was of paramount importance for Russian post-Soviet foreign policy elites to present their foreign policy prescriptions as ‘geopolitical’, i.e., pragmatic, problem-solving and objective, and still to leave some space for human agency and the conscious setting of national aims and goals, i.e., for doing ‘non-geo’ politics. Consequently, Russian post-Soviet ‘geopolitics’ invokes Eurasianism as its inner rationale and meaning, as a greater good that imbues pragmatic, interest-based politics with a sense of mission. It could be argued, therefore, that in view of the legitimising function performed by Eurasianism within the Russian foreign policy discourse, it can hardly be reduced to or equated with geopolitics in any of the conventional meanings of ‘geopolitics’.

However, despite a strong pragmatic, problem-solving current within Eurasianism the prevailing account of the geopolitics/Eurasianism constellation in Russian post-Soviet foreign policy has proceeded precisely along these lines – by stripping Eurasianism of its ideational “topping” and revealing the traditional geopolitical “operational core” of Eurasianism. One such reading developed from within a conceptualisation of Russian 1993 foreign policy change as a ‘geopolitical’ shift, whereby ‘geopolitics’ is employed as a ready-made conceptual tool in order to ‘explain’ this shift and make both the changing mindset of the foreign policy elite and the changing policies intelligible to an outside observer. Such intelligibility is possible due to the fact that a geopolitical “you win, I lose” mindset once again came to define Russia’s relations with its international environment, in particular the relations with the United States.⁸ As a result, the ‘geopolitics’ factor measuring power, status and a relative position vis-a-vis other states in terms of hegemonic spatial control becomes a crucial independent variable explaining Russia’s post-1993 foreign policy in its entirety.

Such zero-sum account of geopolitics ‘spills over’ onto the definition of Eurasianism; it dismisses the benign rhetoric of Eurasianism and highlights instead the assertiveness of the proposed foreign policy course, thereby equating Eurasianism with geopolitics. As has been noted by many, the inclusiveness and universalism of Russia’s Euro-Asian mission to act as a mediator between Western institutions and Eastern diversity is at variance with a pronouncedly geopolitical mindset underpinning the Eurasian drive for integration in the CIS.⁹ Despite all the niceties of Russia’s global mission, the ‘operational core’ of Eurasianism has been the reintegration of the post-Soviet

space through Russia's continuing politico-military predominance in the region.¹⁰ Taking this statement a step further, some commentators suggest that Eurasianism is devoid of substance and that it was only *Realpolitik* discourse about regaining control over the 'near abroad' that reinvigorated the Eurasian idea and lent credence to it.¹¹ In another observer's wry words, as long as Russia's great power status remains a *sine qua non* of the foreign policy debate, Russia's submission to geopolitics is inescapable; as long as Russia desires to be a great power, it must remain a Eurasian power.¹² With Eurasian identity theorising castigated as strategically employed myth-making and taken out of the equation, 'geopolitics' and 'Eurasianism' become synonymous terms almost indistinguishable from each other. Geopolitics as the politics of balance of power and spheres of influence is assumed to have exhausted, subsumed and taken over Eurasianism.

The other attempt to analyse the geopolitics/Eurasianism constellation is equally Eurasianism-unfriendly, even if more benign. On this reading, while providing a full-fledged alternative to the Atlanticist position in the immediate post-Soviet years, Eurasianism has exhausted itself by the end of 1990s. First, the failure of the CIS to develop into a counter-European institution and provide an adequate response to NATO's enlargement marked a geopolitical failure of Eurasianism given a close association between the Eurasian idea and Russia's drive for reintegration of the post-Soviet space. Second, on a more theoretical note, Eurasianism failed to deliver on its own conceptual promise to translate the Eurasian idea into the idea of Russia's mission and national interests, i.e., to steer a middle way between ideology, identity and pragmatism.¹³ Finally, in civilisational terms Eurasianism as Russia's third way in between East and West proved to be a dead-end, "a pretentious neither-nor position [that] erects an unnecessary barrier on the Russian-European border, while doing nothing to strengthen Russia's position in Asia".¹⁴ As a result, geopolitics in its conventional meaning is said to have completely overtaken Eurasianism as the prevailing mode of foreign policy thinking; chronologically, it marked a new phase and a new consensus in Russian foreign policy.

The few attempts to account for the eclipse of Eurasianism as the guiding force in Russian foreign policy under President Putin fit in well with the already well-established mode of reducing Eurasianism to its "geopolitics" component. Conceptually, all fanciful talk of Russia's civilisational uniqueness aside, the common denominator of all various strands of Eurasianism is "the immediate and high priority goal of somehow re-linking Russia with former socialist republics and maintaining a commanding Russian presence in them."¹⁵ Practically, however, Moscow no longer claims exclusive Soviet-style control over the post-Soviet space; it lacks both will and resources to prevent 'geopolitical pluralism' whereby more and more important players, in particular the US after the post-9/11 declaration of the global war on terror, start pursuing their own interests in the region effectively curbing Moscow's

capacity to coerce and intimidate. Thus, both conceptually and practically, Eurasianism is dead because it has failed to sustain a coherent foreign policy.¹⁶

To recapitulate, any account of the geopolitics/Eurasianism constellation on the level of practical geopolitical reasoning makes the credibility of Eurasianist ideational premises dependent on the failure of Eurasian geopolitics to deliver on its promise and materialise. Eurasian ideology/identity construction – what the original post-revolutionary Eurasianists termed “ideocracy” – is treated as superfluous, disposable and secondary to the achievements of developing spheres of influence and exercising exclusive territorial control. The prevalent conceptualisation of the geopolitics/Eurasianism interface turns Eurasianism proper into a ‘superstructure’ on top of the geopolitical ‘base’, so that any shift in the balance of power will bring about an imminent collapse of its ideational legitimation. In a word, the status and meaning of ‘Eurasianism’ is derived from the successes and failures of ‘geopolitics’.

However, setting the terms of the analysis along these lines – by way of making ideology a function of geopolitics-informed power concerns – would have been unthinkable to the original post-revolutionary Eurasianists, not least because the overarching goal of the original Eurasian project was to develop a “truthful” ideological alternative to both Russian Bolshevism and pan-European chauvinistic nationalism. Writing at a time of Russia’s withdrawal from global politics, the Eurasianists set out to attach worldwide significance to Russia’s unique Eurasian identity, i.e., to theorise a distinctive Eurasian ‘ideocracy’ in between identity and ideology and only then to incidentally derive certain policy recommendations from it. By analogy, from the standpoint of classical Eurasianism prioritising the pragmatic, strictly economic dimension of cooperation with the West while criticising the politico-philosophical underpinnings of the West-dominated world order would already mean a decisive ‘no’ to the question of whether Putin is pursuing the policy of Eurasianism.¹⁷

An exposition of the relationship between power and ideology, ‘geopolitics’ and ‘ideocracy’ within classical post-revolutionary Eurasianism should therefore provide a tentative answer to the question “why?” – why after almost a decade of heated debates and forceful arguments Eurasianism was relegated to the margin of the Russian political discourse under President Putin. Given that practical geopolitical reasoning tends to view Eurasianism through the prism of geopolitics, the answer to the above question can only be found on the level of more theory-informed formal geopolitics that flourishes within the ranks of Russian academics, researchers and political analysts. Adherents of formal geopolitics reverse the geopolitics/Eurasianism hierarchy and place the different uses and abuses of the intellectual legacy of classical Eurasianism at the centre of their theorising.

The given study will first briefly review the existing classifications of contemporary Russian Eurasianism-inspired geopolitics and then in section two suggest a different classification according to the different ways in which

the intellectual legacy of Eurasianism is being invoked and appropriated. Russian formal geopolitical reasoning is subdivided into three main strands: 'traditionalist', 'modernist' and 'civilisational' geopolitics. Both 'traditionalists' and 'modernists' invoke Russia's Eurasian identity in order to answer the practical question 'how?' – how Russia should preserve its territorial integrity and enhance its international standing. Proponents of 'civilisational' geopolitics, on the contrary, employ the intellectual resources of classical Eurasianism with a view to answering the question 'what?': what is Russia in the post-Cold War world. In order to answer this question Russian 'civilisationists' follow in the steps of the original Eurasianists and try to ground the idea of Russian distinctiveness in the self-evidence of geopolitical visions, symbols and metaphors. In this they attempt to avoid the classical Eurasianists' failure to reconcile their ideocracy – Orthodox universalism – and the pragmatism of their geopolitics arising from the need to organise the common Eurasian political space. After briefly touching upon the relationship between geopolitics and ideocracy in classical Eurasianism, this article will identify in section three two possible attempts within 'civilisational' geopolitics to apply the lessons of classical Eurasianism to Russia's post-Soviet conditions and suggest the reasons why both attempts fell on deaf ears with the Russian political establishment under President Putin.

THE GEOPOLITICS/EURASIANISM CONSTELLATION REVISITED

One of the common but largely inadequate attempts to account for contemporary Russian formal geopolitics has been to situate it within theoretical frameworks and classificatory models already well established in Western international relations scholarship. However, what this approach neglects and fails to capture are the initial theoretical assumptions and starting points that impart a particular focus to Russia's post-Soviet engagement with geopolitics and make it specifically Russian. Unless approached from the standpoint of the underlying concerns and problematic, Russian geopolitical thinking will prove difficult to subsume fully within a strait-jacket of any of the existing classificatory frameworks.

Thus, although employing the same classification, i.e., Martin Wight's realism-rationalism-revolutionism taxonomy, contemporary observers tend to situate Russian post-Soviet Eurasianism within conceptually different theoretical camps. One such reading suggests that Eurasianism occupies a middle ground and constitutes an alternative to both globally minded "Atlanticists" attempting to reduce global anarchy through the development of multilateral institutions and regimes, and to the adherents of the realist school advocating the pursuit of Russian national interests and the balance of power security strategies.¹⁸ On this account the present-day attempts to revitalise the intellectual legacy of Eurasianism are closely associated with Wight's rationalism

due to the focus on the multilateral dialogue between cultures and civilisations, and on the need to underpin the world balance of power by a civilisational equilibrium. Another classification explicitly drawing on Wight's three traditions of international theory refers to the works of the leading neo-Eurasian Alexander Dugin as "revolutionary expansionism" or "security through expansion school".¹⁹ Here the pursuit of Russia's national interests and the achievement of security goals are closely linked with permanent geopolitical expansionism rather than with the maintenance of stability or institutional cooperation. Thus, different conceptualisations of the contemporary Russian geopolitical discourse within one and the same theoretical framework suggest a need for greater awareness of those features that make this discourse specifically Russian.

Another, and potentially more productive approach to categorisation, attempts to engage Russian post-Soviet geopolitical thinking on its own terms and remain sensitive to the specific problems, questions and concerns that inform this kind of theorising. However, the emphasis has been put exclusively on the Eurasianists' foreign policy prescriptions, i.e., "the Eurasianist strategies for Russia in a post-Cold War era".²⁰ At the same time, as is the case with applying Western classificatory models to the contemporary Russian geopolitical discourse, the focus solely on policy implications is bound to overlook and neglect specifically Russian political and ethical concerns and problematic as well.

First, in view of its "war-prone anti-Western rhetoric", expansionist stance and a highly conflictual account of world politics Russian post-Soviet Eurasianism has been described as "hard-line" and labelled both "New Right" and "National Communism".²¹ Consequently, the analysis has been confined to applying "the conventional wisdom" concepts and categories of political theory and to situating Eurasianism within the radical fringe of the traditional right-centre-left political spectrum. Second, the focus on the actual policy prescriptions to assemble the continental Eurasian Empire and to create a geopolitical alliance Russia-Germany-Japan against Atlanticist policies leads to the conclusion about the predominantly Western intellectual roots of the present-day Eurasian thinking. It is argued that the immutable geopolitical rivalry between continental and maritime civilisations each endowed with its own core ethical values, methods of production and state-building echoes geopolitical theories of Halford Mackinder and Karl Haushofer rather than the ideas propagated by Russian emigrés in the 1920s–1930s.²² Other accounts view contemporary revival of Eurasianism as a direct response to the "clash of civilisations" thesis whereby Russia is presented as either a unique Eurasian civilisation distinct from both Europe and Asia, or as an anti-Western imperial power and a major counter-pole to American hegemony in the world.²³

However, looking at the world of practice through the eyes of the practitioners and identifying theoretical approaches they explicitly employ does

not yet constitute theorising *per se*. Any theory-informed account of the contemporary Russian geopolitical discourse should distance itself from the actual foreign policy prescriptions and concentrate instead on the theoretical reality-defining assumptions that inform different visions of world politics and prompt at times radically different foreign policy prescriptions. Therefore a classification ranking the potential of various definitions of Eurasia to counter new security threats in the region and provide solutions to resurgent ethnic and economic conflicts will not be of much help in answering the questions of Russian post-Soviet identity construction.²⁴ Although insisting on the autonomous existence of politics with regard to economics and rejecting all deterministic arguments, this categorisation still adopts a functionalist rather than historical approach towards the intricacies of the process of Russian identity construction. It analyses the problem-solving capacity of various conceptualisations of Russia-Eurasia rather than their reality-defining theoretical assumptions and normative concerns they are supposed to address.

This paper argues that any account of the geopolitics/Eurasianism constellation in the Russian post-Soviet discourse remains incomplete if it stays on the level of foreign policy prescriptions and ignores the attempts of contemporary Eurasianists to theorise the post-Soviet Russian political identity. At the same time, any serious theoretical engagement with identity construction should by definition start with history because, all metaphysics aside, it is from history that theorists derive their assumptions. Thus, the classification presented in this paper attempts to establish a link between theoretical assumptions and particular historical interpretations and to remain both theory-informed and context-sensitive. Depending on whether the twentieth-century world politics is seen through the prism of continuity or change it is possible to identify three main strands within contemporary Russian geopolitical discourse that may be referred to as 'traditionalist', 'modernist' and 'civilisational' geopolitics. Depending on whether identity is understood as a tradition of customs and mores of a particular historical community, or is theorised from the point of view of its potential to solve pressing political problems, the above-mentioned geopolitical schools can be regrouped further. Thus, adherents of the 'traditionalist' and 'modernist' geopolitical camps are mainly preoccupied with the question "how?" – how Russia should act in order to preserve its territorial integrity and enhance its international standing. The exponents of 'civilisational' geopolitics invoke the intellectual resources of classical post-revolutionary Eurasianism in order to answer the question "what?" – what is Russia in the post-Cold War world order and what its post-Soviet identity can be grounded in.

Traditionalist Geopolitics

Geopolitics in its 'traditionalist' version, quite paradoxically, weds political change with continuity on the level of ideas. Democratisation of Russian

post-Soviet foreign policy dramatically increased the number of the participants in foreign-policy making. The rejection of Communism introduced public debate and parliamentary scrutiny, while political parties became the main channel of ideological pluralism and divergent foreign policy views. Of particular relevance to the development of 'traditionalist' geopolitics, perhaps, was the fact that the dethroning of the Communist ideology and party apparatus removed 'a major psychological block to direct military intervention in politics', thus leading to the emergence of the military as a powerful institutional lobby attempting to shape policies, especially in relation to the 'near abroad'. Hence the rise of 'traditionalist' geopolitics may be viewed as an offensive unleashed by the coalition of the nationalist opposition parties and the military against liberal pro-Western foreign policy and its neglect of Russian interests in the former Soviet space.²⁵

However, as if in an attempt to cancel out both the novelty of the political situation and the institutional and ideational pluralism of Russia's democratising environment, 'traditionalists' make recourse to the categories of geopolitics in order to attach a 'scientific' appeal to their foreign-policy prescriptions and revive the ideological divisions of the Cold War in a new, allegedly timeless, geopolitical guise. The geopolitical 'closure' of the world, accomplished by the end of the nineteenth century, cannot but aggravate the tensions inherent in the international system dominated by Westphalian nation-states. With vast territories falling under exclusive sovereign jurisdiction, states can no longer pursue unmitigated expansion and have to increase their power at the expense of other states. Thus, the territorial component of state-power acquires decisive importance, while world politics takes the form of the struggle for power and ceaseless competition for control over space.

Turned into a timeless, shared, and in this sense objective, value of the international system, 'control over space' becomes the 'scientific' yardstick for 'traditionalist' geopolitics. Moreover, it allows for the reconciliation of continuity on the level of state-preferences and change on the level of the processes through which these unchanging preferences are shaped domestically, as well as the means through which interests may be pursued. If 'control over space' constitutes the essence of interstate relations, then even the most drastic changes in the mechanisms of this control, brought about by information technology, economic and financial globalisation as well as the worldwide expansion of particular cultures, religions and civilisations, do not modify the structure of interstate relations.²⁶

Eurasianism, on this view, serves as merely a tool in the growing repertoire of the possible means of the territorial control. The Eurasian legacy understood as the common Soviet past and longstanding neighbourly relations between Slav and Turkic peoples are invoked in order to attach some moral significance to the principle of the territorial integrity of the Russian state. On the level of specific policy-prescriptions, however, this brand of Eurasianism remains confined to the economic integration of the post-Soviet

space and security cooperation within the institutional framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia's Eurasian ambitions are justified not by its historic destiny but the convergence of the economic preconditions necessary for the practical realisation of the Eurasian idea, whatever its origins or ethical underpinnings are. Eurasianism is proposed as the state-ideology, capable of providing the ideational underpinnings for the current borders of Russia, on strictly pragmatic, utilitarian grounds.

Modernist Geopolitics

However, even such a thin, instrumentalist approach to Eurasianism is perceived as a theoretical anathema by Russian 'modernist' geopolitics, flourishing mainly within Russia's academic community. In contradistinction to strategy-oriented traditionalists, their modernist counterparts emphasise the processes of cooperation and consolidation on the global scale leading to the emergence of complex interdependence between various – economic, military, socio-cultural – aspects of political influence and thus turning power into an essentially diffused and elusive phenomenon impossible to confine within either national or regional borders.²⁷ Thus, for the 'modernists', the 'geo' prefix in 'geopolitics' refers, in the first instance, to the global dimension of political power. Given their second major premise, multipolarity, the unit of the 'modernist' geopolitical analysis is 'objectively existing spatial entities – big spaces – that have political significance', while geopolitics as a scientific 'discipline' aims at 'locating and predicting the spatial borders between various – military, economic, political, civilisational – clusters of power on a global scale' in order to form 'objective notions of the world order as a spatial correlation between such clusters of power'.²⁸

'Modernists' stop short of identifying Russia with any particular idea of Eurasia. However, underlying the 'multipolarity' thesis is the tacit recognition of Russia's Eurasian distinctiveness, only this time it is confined to Russia's strategic 'openness' to both West, South and the Far East. On the 'modernist' view, this geopolitical centrality is bound to bring about a balanced, multi-vector foreign policy ensuring Russia's great power status and turning it into an indispensable collective security provider and one of the main pillars of a multipolar world.

To restate, Russian traditionalist geopoliticians bring in Eurasianism on pragmatic, utilitarian grounds in an attempt to provide a justification for the existence of the Russian state in its current borders. Their modernist counterparts equate Russia's political greatness with its strategic geopolitical location rather than with any specifically Russian-Eurasian idea of political organisation. By contrast, adherents of civilisational geopolitics employ the intellectual resources of Eurasianism so as to theorise Russia's uniqueness in the first place. Now all questions are situated at the territory/identity interface and explore particular ways in which the territorial dimension of the

Russian state has been constitutive of Russian political identity. On this 'internal' view, the break-up of the Soviet Union is seen as a major watershed in the country's history necessitating a major reassessment of Russia's place in world affairs. In this, 'civilisational' geopolitics closely follows the themes initially developed by post-revolutionary Eurasians as a response to a similar crisis of the dissolution of the Russian Empire. Perhaps more importantly, Russian post-Soviet 'civilisational' geopolitics inherits the tensions and contradictions that the original post-revolutionary Eurasians failed to resolve back in the 1920s–1930s.

According to one of the most insightful interpretations of classical Eurasianism, it was plagued from the start by the need to reconcile two radically different ethico-political projects – each underpinned by its own 'ideocracy' and 'geopolitics' – within one and the same programmatic formula Russia-Eurasia.²⁹ On the one hand, there was a familiar idea of Russia's cultural-geographic position in-between Europe and Asia embodied in the political idea of a multi-ethnic and multi-national state. This particular conceptualisation of Russia-Eurasia is labelled "Eurasianism of the givens" marking the primacy of politics over ethics, power over ideology, geopolitics over ideocracy. Consequently, the technique and the results of the Bolshevik assembling of the state are elevated to an ideology in the idea of pan-Eurasian nationalism, i.e., the idea of a common Eurasian destiny shared by all the peoples inhabiting the Soviet state.

On the other hand, of paramount importance to the Eurasian project as a whole was the role and meaning of Russian Orthodoxy as a marker of both Russia's civilisational distinctiveness and its worldwide moral authority. Such "Eurasianism of values" assuming the primacy of 'one truthful ideology' and treating all otherness as "potential Orthodoxy" finds its expression in the geopolitical formula of Russia-(as-the-spiritual-core-of)-Eurasia. Orthodox universalism and the pragmatism of organising the common Eurasian political space could not but come into conflict. Although actively propagating the idea of Eurasian unity under the leadership of Orthodox Russia, Russian post-revolutionary Eurasianists had to eventually abandon this idea when faced with multi-ethnic and multi-religions reality and to embrace Bolshevism and Soviet power-politics. An idea of order that could be meaningful to the various peoples of the nascent Soviet state was never found. It can be argued, therefore, that modern-day 'civilisational' geopolitics develops out of the post-revolutionary Eurasians' failure to reconcile ethical universalism and political necessity.

Civilisational Geopolitics

The geopolitical constructions "Island Russia" and "Heartland Russia" were put forward by Vadim Tsimburskii and Alexander Dugin respectively in an attempt to postulate the primacy of either ideocracy or geopolitics. While

Dugin tries to rescue Eurasianism by restoring it to its universal – Orthodox – foundations, Tsymburskii deliberately distances himself from the ideocratic core of Eurasianism. He focuses on the practical concern with Russia's identity at the time of its withdrawal from global politics, this time resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In doing so, Tsymburskii attempts to avoid the impasse in which the Eurasian reconstruction of Russian post-revolutionary identity found itself in the late 1920s.

ISLAND RUSSIA

Consequently, Tsymburskii grounds Russian geopolitical identity in the experience of inhabiting and, more importantly, 'conquering' a particular space. Here, the seventeenth-century 'discovery of Siberia' emerges as a momentous identity-constitutive event. The incorporation of the vast region to the east of the Urals into a single Russian 'ethno-civilisational' plain turned Russia into a gigantic, internally homogenous 'island' inside the continent.³⁰ Protected by vast uninhabited lands from any invasion in the East and shielded from any direct political or economic dependence on the West by a belt of marginalised East European 'stream-territories', Russia asserted itself as a politically consolidated bulwark against the hegemonic upheavals that were sweeping revolutions and ferocious wars throughout the rest of the continent turning it into a patchwork of distinctively modern nation-states. In Tsymburskii's theorising, Russia's seventeenth-century experience of 'splendid isolation' prior to the attempts by Peter the Great to integrate Russia into Europe constitutes the basic geopolitical pattern 'Island Russia' that survives all the vicissitudes of the imperial phase(s) of Russian history and forms the stable core of Russian civilisational identity.

Indeed, the almost perfect congruity between the borders of the Russian state on the eve of Peter's accession to power and the borders of the state which emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union enables Tsymburskii to interpret the latter as Russia's 'return' to its island which now must be accompanied by a shift in geopolitical priorities. Russia has to abandon any attempt to incorporate the Caucasus and Central Asia into its geopolitical body again. Historically, these attempts were not an expression of Russia's unifying mission, as Eurasians would have it. They followed instead from Russia's desire to 'kidnap' Europe and its inability to do so. Now that Russia has a chance to resume its genuine, authentic political existence it should concentrate on revitalising Siberia and the Far East. Unlike Eurasianism's attempt at reconciling geopolitics with religious ideocracy, Tsymburskii's is, in his own words, a "secular geopolitical project".³¹

Indeed, in the absence of an absolute ethical principle that could be meaningfully reconstructed on the level of politics it falls to geopolitics to separate Russia and the Russians from the rest of the world. The geopolitical metaphor of an 'Island' requires another geopolitical metaphor – that of a

'Sea' threatening to engulf the 'island' of uniqueness and difference. Therefore, a geographical border is imposed and Russia is inscribed within an 'island' in order to be protected from the flux of economic globalisation whose pernicious unifying tendencies are already at work in what Tsymburskii defines as the Great Periphery spanning Central Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and Central Asia. The crucial task of Russia in this constellation is to develop a conscious geopolitical strategy in the Great Periphery in order to preserve its own territorial integrity which, at bottom, defines Russia's identity.

HEARTLAND RUSSIA

According to Alexander Dugin, Russia's civilisational uniqueness goes far beyond the vicissitudes of a single community's history and acquires worldwide, in fact, metaphysical significance. In spite of all the secular, imperial, Westward phases of its history, in its essence Russia has always remained an Orthodox Empire once united under the dual, religious/political, leadership of the Patriarch and the Tsar. Through its commitment to Orthodoxy Russia has kept intact the remnants of what used to be the universal faith, the worldwide holy civilisation. Now that the world is on the brink of a secular disaster, Russia alone can restore its moral unity and spearhead the religious revival of humankind.

Thus, unlike the original Eurasians, Dugin presents a case for Russian worldwide spiritual leadership and portrays Russia as the universal Heartland rather than that of the Euro-Asian continent alone. This difference in scale apparently enables him to escape from the contradiction that plagued the Eurasian movement of the 1920s: between Russia as being both Europe and Asia, and its portrayal as being neither. For Dugin, Russia's civilisational distinctiveness, unequivocally equated with Orthodoxy, hinges upon the vision of Christianity as 'neither Judaism nor Hellenism' and represents an autonomous third way cutting through the levels of politics, religion and metaphysics.

The metaphysical dimension, reflected on the plane of religion, makes Orthodox Christianity unique, different from the traditions labelled by Dugin as 'creationism' and 'manifestationism'. On the one hand, Christianity fully embraces the distance separating the divine authority from the world of matter postulated by Judaic 'creationism'. On the other hand, it attaches a different meaning to the act of creation itself. What in creationism appears as an arbitrary demonstration of might, God's deliberate abandonment of his own creation, in Christianity emerges as an act of God's love for something which is essentially different from and inferior to himself.³² God's benevolence and grace reach their peak in the earthly incarnation in the person of Jesus Christ, whereby 'the superior transcendental God separated from the creation by an unbridgeable abyss unites himself through his Son

with the created and ultimately inferior human world'.³³ In contradistinction to the 'optimistically natural' divinity of the world of matter in Hellenic 'manifestationism', Christianity postulates the divinity of the non-divine, man's transformation in the light of God's grace and his unification with the absolute.³⁴

Transition to politics is made through the assertion that humans cannot overcome their inferior status and bridge the gap between the Creator and the creation through their individual efforts. Human participation in the transcendental can only be realised through complete immersion into the political sphere, through collective political existence underpinned by a strict observance of religious beliefs. Thus, the realisation of God's kingdom requires a political community and active involvement of the earthly king who alone acts as a mediator and a gatekeeper between the secular and the divine. This dual, religious/secular, leadership, the unity of God's kingdom and sovereign rule, the 'symphony of powers' constitutes the third way on the level of politics, opposed to both Judaic, theocratic organisation of society and to the absolutist, God-like, divine character of secular rule in Hellenism.

Finally, on the level of geopolitics Dugin presents 'Heartland Russia' as a value-laden rather than merely geopolitical concept. It has very little to do with the strategic central location ensuring absolute power and security à la Mackinder and classical geopolitics. 'Heartland Russia' here signifies the centre of the universe, a birthplace of humankind, a hearth of ancient civilisation, a projection of heaven on earth, a Holy Land of the forefathers. This 'essentialist' holiness resides in the figure of the sovereign whose sanctity and greatness transcend ethnic divisions and acquire supraethnic, imperial, universal significance. At bottom, Eurasian geopolitics and Orthodox ideocracy merge and become indistinguishable in the sovereign presence of the almighty divine Emperor vested with absolute law-enforcing and decision-making power. However, Dugin's geopolitical enterprise runs into the same impasse as the early Eurasians' project, only now on the global scale, revealing the same failure to reconcile ethical universalism and political necessity, messianic Orthodoxy and pan-Eurasian nationalism.

The inherent tension between 'ideocracy' and 'geopolitics' establishing the lines of continuity between the 'old' and the 'new' Eurasianism sheds a new light on the fate of Eurasianism in post-Soviet Russia. However, the question that immediately arises is why neither Tsymburskii's "secular geopolitical project" nor Dugin's 'Eurasianism of values' has elicited any support or even interest from the Russian political elites under President Putin? This paper suggests that Sergei Prozorov's conceptualisation of Russian post-communism as the end of history is particularly informative and helpful in accounting for the rise and fall of Eurasianism in Russian post-Soviet politics.³⁵ Despite the self-representation of Putin's regime as a return to 'normal politics' after the chaos and lawlessness of the 1990s, there is an inherent affinity between the two political orders with regards to their temporality. Both the

revolutionary moment of the Yeltsin presidency and the self-proclaimed stability of Putin's rule are well captured by the 'end of history' thesis, whereby politics loses its teleological dimension with the demise of Soviet communism. Both regimes effectively avoided any identification with a progressivist ideological project, although for different reasons. The Yeltsin presidency derived its legitimation from the break-up of the Soviet system; the regime sustained itself in power for the whole of the 1990s because it managed to successfully capitalise on the revolutionary 'dividends'. As a result, Eurasianism was allowed to 'happen' under Yeltsin but it was not allowed to wholly define Russian politics so that it could not undermine the overarching significance of the revolutionary event – the fall of Communism. The underlying motive of Putin's rule, on the contrary, is the fear of revolution as such. The Putin period is characterised, according to Prozorov, by the "ateleological suspension of the messianic" in "the stable endurance of the present" as if the revolutionary event neither has nor will ever take place. It may be safely assumed that any value-based, teleological political project such as approximation of politics to the tenets of Russian Orthodoxy Dugin-style will not just be out of place, but is likely to be actively resisted in such political context.

However, what prevents Tsymburskii's "secular geopolitical project" of Island Russia from resonating with the Russian political establishment under Putin? In Tsymburskii's own words, any genuinely geopolitical project in Russia should offer an idea of a common good and common interest to the disoriented society.³⁶ However, such "all-national goal-setting" runs counter to Putin's "pragmatism without ends" which celebrates the certainty and determinacy of the present and which by definition evades all future-oriented definitions of goals on behalf of a single polity. In order to characterise the current regime as profoundly a-political and technocratic Tsymburskii coins the term "Great Russia Utilization Inc." which simultaneously conveys the essence of Putin's rule both in disguise and in reality.³⁷ The "Great Russia" rhetoric is offered to the people as an exercise in common memory-writing based on the glorious past and as a substitute for economic well-being and the lack of basic living standards. At the same time, the "Great Russia Utilization Inc." literally means what it says: the utilisation of whatever resources are still left from the imperial "Great Russia" times whereby people's participation is neither wanted nor required. It is only to be expected, therefore, that the technocratic rule sustained by the state and society's mutual non-interference and non-engagement with each other should refrain from any articulation of a common political project launched by the state on behalf of the people. The account of classical and post-Soviet Eurasianism through the prism of the relationship between 'ideocracy' and 'geopolitics' demonstrates therefore why under the conditions of Putin's self-proclaimed normalcy and stability Eurasianism – either in its affirmation or in its negation – has turned into a metaphorical dog that did not bark.

CONCLUSION

This article has sought to problematise what is usually taken for granted in the literature – the failure of Eurasianism to develop into a foreign policy regime of truth and conceptually sustain a coherent post-Soviet Russian foreign policy. Instead of attributing the fate of Eurasianism to the ups and downs of Russia's power play in the post-Soviet space, it is argued that Eurasianism as a particular tradition of theorising Russia's identity and place in the world has a momentum of its own that transcends the pragmatics of Russian post-Soviet foreign policy. Rather than equating post-Soviet Eurasianism with some preconceived notion of geopolitics, a historical and more context-sensitive account of contemporary Eurasianism is provided by way of locating its intellectual roots within the post-revolutionary Eurasianists' failure to reconcile their own understanding of 'geopolitics' and what they termed 'ideocracy' – an idea of both Russia's unique identity and a truly Russian ideology alternative to Soviet Bolshevism and pan-European nationalism. Any approximation of politics to the tenets of Russian Orthodox 'ideocracy' could compromise the territorial integrity of the Soviet-Eurasian state, while the elevation of Soviet 'geopolitics' to the level of pan-Eurasian ideology could hardly be expected to acquire worldwide moral significance. Thus, one of the contemporary attempts to apply Eurasianism to the Russian post-Soviet condition dismisses with ideology and views the territorial dimension of the Russian state as the only suitable 'container' and 'mould' of Russian political identity. The other strand of contemporary neo-Eurasianism persists in positioning Eurasianism as a metaphysical, religious and ideological 'third way' capable of being reproduced on the level of politics. However, as the article argues, any value-based, future-oriented political project is unthinkable in contemporary Russia given that Putin's 'pragmatism without ends' derives its legitimation from the 'normalcy' and 'stability' of the present. It therefore remains to be seen whether an opposition to the current technocratic regime's non-engagement with either Russian society or the world at large should require as its ideational inspiration the intellectual resources of classical Eurasianism.

NOTES

1. On the link between Eurasianism and Pragmatic Nationalism, see Margot Light, 'Foreign Policy Thinking', in Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison, and Margot Light, *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996). On the place of Eurasianism within the Russian foreign policy debate, see Neil MacFarlane, 'Russia, the West and European Security,' *Survival* 35/3 (1993) p. 11; Bruce Porter, 'Russia and Europe After the Cold War: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policies', in Celeste Wallander (ed.), *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1996) p. 121; Andrew Bouchkin, 'Russia's Far Eastern Policy in the 1990s: Identity in Russian Foreign Policy', in Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha (eds.), *The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (Armonk, NY: London: Sharpe 1995) pp. 67–71.

2. Sergei Stankevich, 'A Transformed Russia in a New World', *International Affairs (Moscow)* (April–May 1992) p. 99.
3. Vladimir Lukin, 'Our Security Predicament', *Foreign Policy* 88 (Autumn 1992) p. 58.
4. Vladimir Lukin, 'Russia and Its Interests', in Stephen Sestanovich (ed.), *Rethinking Russia's National Interest* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies 1994) p. 110.
5. Bobo Lo, *Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking* (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2002) pp. 18–19.
6. Sergei Stankevich, quoted in Light (note 1) p. 47; see also Lukin, 'Russia and Its Interests' (note 4) pp. 107–110.
7. Graham Smith, 'The Masks of Proteus: Russia, Geopolitical Shift and the New Eurasianism', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, New Series 24, no. 4 (1999) p. 488.
8. Lo, 'Geopolitical Strain', in *Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era* (note 4) p. 99.
9. See, for example, Light's assessment of Stankevich's in Malcolm et al. (note 1) pp. 47–48.
10. Mette Skak, *From Empire to Anarchy: Post-Communist Foreign Policy and International Relations* (London: Hurs & Co. 1996) p. 143.
11. Pavel Baev, 'Russia's Departure from Empire: Self-Assertiveness and a New Retreat', in Ola Tunander, Pavel Baev, and Victoria Einagel (eds.), *Geopolitics in post-Wall Europe: Security, Territory and Identity* (London: Sage 1997) p. 182.
12. David Kerr, 'The New Eurasianism: The Rise of Geopolitics in Russia's Foreign Policy', *Europe-Asia Studies* 47/6 (Sep. 1995) pp. 986–987.
13. Alexander Sergounin, Rossiiskaia Vneshepoliticheskaia Mysl': Problemy Natsional'noi i Mezhdunarodnoi Bezopasnosti [Russian Foreign Policy Thinking: Problems of National and International Security] (Nizhny Novgorod: Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University Press 2003) pp. 29–30.
14. Dmitri Trenin, *The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2002) p. 36.
15. Paul Kubicek, 'The Evolution of Eurasianism and the Monroeski Doctrine under Vladimir Putin', paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Quebec, March 2004, available at <www.allacademic.com>, accessed 3 Feb. 2009, p. 8.
16. Richard Sakwa, 'Putin's Foreign Policy: Transforming the 'East'', in Gabriel Gorodetsky (ed.), *Russia between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the XXIst Century* (London: Frank Cass 2003) p. 188.
17. Matthew Schmidt, 'Is Putin Pursuing the Policy of Eurasianism?', *Demokratizatsiia* (Winter 1995) p. 93.
18. Alexander Sergounin, 'Russian Post-Communist Foreign Policy Thinking at the Crossroads: Changing Paradigms', *Journal of International Relations and Development* 3 (2000) pp. 220–233.
19. Andrei Tsygankov, 'From International Institutionalism to Revolutionary Expansionism: The Foreign Policy Discourse of Contemporary Russia', *Mershon International Studies Review* 41 (1997) p. 249. For the realist conceptualisation of contemporary Russian geopolitics in general and Eurasianism in particular, see Alexei Bogaturov, 'Realisticheskaia Tendentsiia v Rossiiskoi Teorii Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii' [Realist Tendency in Russian International Relations Theory], *Vestnik MGU, Serii 18 'Sotsiologiya i Politologiya'* 4 (2003) pp. 3–21. For the analysis of the post-Soviet Eurasianism through the prism of Western political realism, see Andrei Tsygankov, 'Hard-Line Eurasianism and Russia's Contending Geopolitical Perspectives', *East European Quarterly* XXXII/3 (1998) pp. 315–334.
20. Ibid., pp. 317–321.
21. Cf. Smith (note 7) pp. 481–494; Andrei Tsygankov, 'The Irony of Western Ideas in a Multicultural World: Russians' Intellectual Engagement with the 'End of History' and 'Clash of Civilizations'', *International Studies Review* 5 (2003) pp. 53–76.
22. Vladimir Kolossov and Rostislav Turovsky, 'Russian Geopolitics at the Fin-de-Siecle', *Geopolitics* 21/1 (2001) p. 145.
23. Tsygankov, 'Irony' (note 21) pp. 65–66. For the portrayal of the post-Soviet Eurasianism along both geopolitical and civilisational lines, see John O'Laughlin, 'Geopolitical Fantasies, National Strategies and Ordinary Russians in the post-Communist Era', *Geopolitics* 6/3 (2001) pp. 17–48.
24. Andrei Tsygankov, 'Mastering Space in Eurasia: Russia's Geopolitical Thinking after the Soviet Break-Up', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 36 (2003) pp. 101–127.
25. Roy Allison, 'Military Factors in Foreign Policy', in Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison, and Margot Light (eds.), *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy* (Oxford: OUP 1996) pp. 230–231. Generally,

here I am referring mostly to one particular affiliation of researchers, the 'Academy of Geopolitical Problems', who come predominantly from within the ranks of the former Soviet military.

26. Cf. Nikolai Nartov, *Geopolitika* [Geopolitics] (Moscow: Unity 2003) pp. 25–31. See also Vladimir Petrov, *Geopolitika Rossii* [Geopolitics of Russia] (Moscow: Veche 2003) pp. 10–11; and Leonid Ivashov, *Rossia ili Moskovia? Geopoliticheskoe Izmerenie Natsional'noi Bezopasnosti Rossii* [Russia or Moscow? Geopolitical Dimension of Russia's National Security] (Moscow: Eksmo 2002) pp. 8–9.

27. Cf. Konstantin Sorokin, *Geopolitika Sovremennosti i Geostrategiia Rossii* [Contemporary Geopolitics and Geostrategy of Russia] (Moscow: ROSSPEN 1996).

28. Kamaludin Gadzhiev, *Vvedenie v Geopolitiku* [Introduction to Geopolitics] (Moscow: Logos 2003) pp. 38–39, 68–70, 314–315; Vladimir Kolossov and Nikolai Mironenko, *Geopolitika i Politicheskaiia Geografiia* [Geopolitics and Political Geography] (Moscow: Aspekt Press 2002) pp. 18–24.

29. Vadim Tsymburskii, 'Dve Evrazii: omonimia kak kliuch k ideologii rannego evraziistva' [Two Eurasias: Homonymy as a Key to Early Eurasianism], *Acta Eurasica* 1–2 (1998) pp. 26–27.

30. Vadim Tsymburskii, 'Ostrov Rossiia: Perspektivy Rossiiskoi Geopolitiki' [Island Russia: Prospects of Russian Geopolitics], *Polis* 5 (1993) pp. 6–23.

31. Vadim Tsymburskii, 'Geopolitika Dlya Evraziiskoi Atlantidy' [Geopolitics for the Eurasian Atlantida], *Pro et Contra* 4 (1999) p. 7.

32. Alexander Dugin, *Absolutnaia Rodina* [Absolute Motherland] (Moscow: Arctogaia 1999) p. 217.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 249.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 266.

35. Sergei Prozorov, 'Russian post-Communism and the End of History', *Studies in East European Thought* 60 (2008) pp. 207–209.

36. Vadim Tsymburskii, 'Russkie i Geoeconomika' [Russians and Geoeconomy], *Pro et Contra* 8/2 (Spring 2003) p. 179.

37. Vadim Tsymburskii, 'ZAO Rossiia' [Closed Joint Stock Company Russia], *Russkii Zburnal* [Russian Journal] (8 May 2002), available at <www.old.russ.ru>, accessed 9 Feb. 2009.